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PREFACE
This paper was prepared on the basis of a research study of
innovations, carried out by the authors. It's main aim is to
promote a closer consensus in the discussion about innovation
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BASIC IMPROVEMENT AND PSEUDO-INNOVATIONS
AND THEIR IMPACT ON EFFICIENCY
Heinz-Dieter Haustein and Harry Maier
The present need to raise the level of economic and social
efficiency is realized in developed countries as well as in the
developing countries on the various administration levels. This
pressure existed also in former times, but now it has a new
historical quality because it is interlinked with fundamental
problems of existence. The whole resource processing system has
changed from both sides: economic conditions for extraction of
resources have worsened, often dramatically, and the structure of
needs has become more dynamic. Increasing gaps between needs
and resources lead both directly and indirectly to many economic
and political implications, and have a widely uncontrolled feed-
back to the national economy. The smaller the transparency of
events the greater the danger of actions accelerating the dif-
ficulties. This is correct for the national level as well as
for single organizations.
Finding a new word for our ignorance we often use the
word "turbulence" for all unexpected and dramatic events which
change the preconditions of our plans and decisions. They occur
from the rising complexity of our resource processing system, as
well as from the regrouping of political and economic forces.
Single instances of turbulence are mostly not foreseeable in their
concrete data and parameters. But the question is whether there
is any bridge between the instances of turbulence, or more precisely,
to what extent turbulence and the impotence of economic actors
are caused by the actors themselves.
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It is now widely accepted that technological change is a
mighty tool for social and economic growth, but for a long time
economic theory handled technological progress as manna coming
from heaven. In practice technology was always closely connected
with the main economic driving forces of a given society. Forma-
tion of individual capital as well as formation of national econo-
mies paved the way for the main inventions and innovations. But
obviously we also find here the explanation for the trouble our
resource processing system is now faced with.
PREFERENCE OF IMPROVEMENT POLICY -
A REAL DANGER TO ECONOMY
There are two tendencies which have a. great impact on effic-
iency. Firstly, the increasing capital intensity (capital coef-
ficient) leads to a strong orientation towards improvement of
given technological systems connected with changes of lower order.
Nobody is interested in essential changes if they are interlinked
with big losses in advanced capital funds. Capital coefficient
is only a very general measure for many specific problems on the
firm level. Table 1 shows the problems arising in practice by
transition from an improvement policy to basic technological
changes in market production, research and development, and in
management.
Therefore it is understandable that there is a strong ten-
dency towards improvement policy (changes of lower order) in many
firms. Figure 1 and Table 2 show the situation in the US over
a period of twenty years. We can see that the number and the
share of radical breakthroughs is declining very quickly. The
same situation can be identified in other countries.
Of course the situation is different in various industries.
Table 3 shows the situation in US industry from 1953 to 1973.
The number of major innovations over the period from 1953 to
1973 in electrical equipment and communication is significantly
greater than in textiles or paper production. To go into more
detail, the age of principal technical solutions in washing
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Table 1. Implications of basic technological changes and
improvements on the firm level.
Factor
1. lvtarket
2. Production
3. Research and
development
4. Management
5. Social
consequences
Basic changes
Demand large but unpre-
dictable
High risk of a failure
Slow acceptance in the
beginning
Creation of new marketing
system necessary
Obsolescence of capacities
/
of existing labor skills
and existing cooperation
Interruption of learning
processes
New and unanticipated
problems in quality,
costs -and effects
Advanced research poteri-
tial needed
Necessity of new research
fields and disciplines
High research and devel-
opment risk
Obsolescence of manage-
ment skills, methods
and
organizational solutions
Increase of complexity
Legal and social accep-
tance cannot be predicted
Improvements
Demand well-known
and foreseeable
Rapid acceptance
Use of well-known
channels
l1aximum use of
given capacities
Benefits from learn-
ing processes and
streamlined designs
However risk in
quality and process
planning
Use of existing
R&D potential
Basic research
not necessary
Risk relatively
predictable
Use of experienced
management systems
Amendments of given
organizational
solutions
Little or no unpre-
dicatable problems
machines, refrigerators, textile machines, batteries, electrical
tools, combustion engines, and transport machines is, on average,
higher than 25 years. On the other hand, the age of principal
technical solutions in radio components, electronic calculators,
and watches, is less than 10 years. However in general the
statistical coefficient
Number of subclasses in a product group
Number of years from the start of the product group as a whole
is decreasing. There are studies showing the mechanisms from the
example of specific industries. W.J. Abernathy (1978) analyzed
Percent of the
innovations in
each time period
50
40
30
20
10
0"---................
1953-1959
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Figure 1. Estimated radicalness of major US innovations,
1953-1973.
Source: Science Indicators (1976), US National Science
Foundation (1977).
Table 2. Estimated radicalness of major US Innovations,
1953-1973.
Radicalness classification 1953-73period 53-59 60-66 67-73
Percent distribution
Total 100 100 100 100
Radical breakthrough 26 36 26 16
Major technological shift 28 17 31 35
Improvement 38 39 37 40
Imitation or no new technology 8 8 6 20
Number of innovations
Total 250 75 94 81
Radical breakthrough 64 27 24 12
Major technological shift 70 13 29 28
Improvement 96 29 35 32
Imitation or no new technology 20 6 6 8
Source: Science Indicators (1976), US National Science
Foundation (1977) .
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Table 3. Major US innovations by industry, 1953-1973.
Industry
Total
Manufacturing industries
Electrical equipment and communication
Chemicals and allied products
Machinery
Professional and scientific instruments
Stone, clay, and glass products
Motor vehicles and other transportation
equipment
Primary metals
Rubber products
Aircraft and missiles
Fabricated metal products
Petroleum refining and extraction
Textiles and apparel
Paper and allied products
Food and kindred products
Lumber, wood products, and furniture
Nonmanufacturing industries
Number of
innovations
310
277
53
45
44
29
18
18
17
15
11
10
5
4
4
2
2
33
% of
total
100
89
17
15
14
9
6
6
5
5
4
3
2
1
1
1
1
11
Note: Detail may not add to totals because of rounding
Source: Science Indicators (1976), US National Science
Foundation (1977).
the transition process from major product changes to rising major
process changes, and then to both the product and process improve-
ments on the classical example of the automobile industry. Another
classical example is the lighting industry. From 1915 to 1959
innovations in the field of incandescent lamps were mainly incre-
mental, with an increase of efficiency nearly 30 or 40 per cent.
However, from 1939 to 1969 productivity of the production process
had an increase of more than 900 per cent. Therefore our study
of innovations in the lighting industry (Haustein 1979) confirms
the findings of Abernathy on the sequence of product and process
innovation.
An overwhelming share of incremental innovations in economic
growth has a strong impact on the management system as a whole.
So the attention which has arisen about learning curves as a tool
for planning is only a reflection of the present improvement
attitude. Learning curves are applicable to all cases of step-
by-step improvements, but they are not appropriate for describing
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all kinds of development. Their broad applicability is caused by
the importance of simple experience in all activities of man.
. I'However, man is not simply an experienced tool-using anlma ,
he is also an imaginative-thinking animal. He finds out new ways
of progress, beginning new learning curves.
From the standpoint of long-term development Christopher
Freeman wrote:
The bunching of groups of related inventions and the
investment needed to bring about their widespread in-
troduction is a more probable pattern of development
than the incrementalism associated with run-of-the-
mill modifications to established technologies,
responding to minor changes in the market (Freeman 1978) .
This may be quite correct, but another question arises of how
closely these investments are linked with fundamental inventions.
The probability of basic innovations is smaller the more non
amortised capital is bound in a given industry. A second reason
for the preference of improvements is the high short-term-bene-
fits promised by all kinds of compensation or balancing processes.
Reducing bottlenecks in performance or efficiency of a given
system is called "compensation process" (Ausgleichsprozess).
This process gives a fast rising benefit from the beginning up
to the point where the equilibrium is reached and then benefits
'are diminishing. Technological progress leads to an increasing
diversity and disproportionality of the technical basis (see
Haustein 1974). So chances of compensatory processes are occurring
everywhere. This is a positive feedback causing the preference
of improvement policy. Compensation is a kind of improvement.
Basic changes are often connected with overcompensation establish-
ing new bottlenecks. At the beginning they have often no benefits
but heavy losses and only after a longer time-period benefits
become much higher than those from improvement policy alone.
If we look at a given sample of technologies in one area
over a longer time, we can always realize how difficult it is to
determine the benefits from expected basic changes. Table 4
shows this on the example of the energy field.
From our present standpoint breeder reactors, fusion, solar
electricity, or fuels from the biomass are principally new
Table 4. The strategy of technology introduction in the US energy field.
Time of
impact
Near term
(now to 1985
and beyond)
Mid term
(1985-2000
and beyond)
Long term
(past 2000)
Strategic element
Increase of efficiency of
energy use and convert
waste to energy
Preserve and expand oil, gas,
coal and nuclear
Accelerate development of
synthetic fuels from coal
and shale
Increase use of under-used
(limited application) fuel
forms and attract more usable
energy from ,waste heat
Develop the technologies
necessary to use the essen-
tially inexhaustible fuel
resources
Develop the technology neces-
sary to change the existing
distribution systems to
accommodate the distribution
of new energy sources
Technology
Conservation in buildings and
consumer products
Industrial energy efficiency
Transportation efficiency
Waste materials to energy
Coal-direct utilization in
utility
Nuclear-converter reactors
Oil and gas enhanced recovery
Gaseous and liquid fuels from
coal
Oil shale
Geothermal
Solar heating and cooling
Waste heat utilization
Breeder reactors
Fusion
Solar electric
Electric conversion efficiency
Electric power transmission and
distribution
Electric transport
Electric storage
Hydrogen in energy supplies
Fuels from biomass
Impact in
year 2000*
7 • 1
8.0
9.0
4.9
24.5
28.0
1 3 .6
14.0
7.3
3.1-5.6
5.9
4.9
3 • 1
2.1-4.2
2.6
1 .4
1 • 3
1 .4
I
-...l
I
*Quads = 1015Btu.
Source: A National Plan for Energy Research, Development and Demonstration: Creating
Energy Choices for the Future, United States Superintendent of Documents,
Washington, 1976.
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solutions. The real benefits are unknown or relatively small
in the predictable future. (Total primary energy demand in the
US in the year 2000 is something approaching 120 Quads).
INNOVATION AND INVENTION IS NOT THE SAME
When speaking of the patterns of technological progress we
use the term "innovation". This term is well-known since its
introduction by Schurnpeter (1911), and should not be mixed up
wi th the term ｾ ｩ ｮ ｶ ･ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ Ｂ Ｎ ｯ Innovation includes not only research
and development stages, but also technical realization, and com-
mercialization. However, looking at the great stock of innova-
tion studies and books we see two main gaps:
the first is the rather micro-economic approach in most
of the studies,
the second is in connection with the first; the fact
that innovation has been considered as a single process,
a single technological change in the narrow sense of the
word "technological".
Our approach differs from this. We think that innovation
must be treated another way.o 0
Let us have a look at the history of technology. There
are many examples where single important technical solutions
had at least no socio-economic impact. One example is the big
steamboat "Great Eastern ll which in the middle of the 19th century
was a fundamental new solution. For instance, its motive power
was 100 times stronger than in usual Ships, and its tonnage was
up to 7 times greater. However such a ship was at that time not
appropriate ｢ ｾ ｣ ｡ ｵ ｳ ･ ports and service facilities for repairs, etc.,
were not able to support its use. After several years the ship-
ping trade firm which owned the steamboat went into bankruptcy
because they had not been able to $tand the bad economic conse-
quences (see Henriot 1955).
Another example. Many inventions in electrical engineering
were well-known a hundred years ago. The exhibition of electrical
products in Vienna in 1883 showed such things as electric water
heaters, electrical hearths, electric cushions, and electric
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motors (see Gross 1933), but there was no application to the
existing complexes of needs and resources, and so only one of
these inventions completely changed the existing demand system,
and this was the case of lighting. The power station in Berlin
was founded in 1885 and until 1900 electricity demand was mainly
for lighting. The reason for electric lighting becoming a basic
innovation was that firstly, a rapidly rising and expanded demand
could be established in this field. Electrical illumination of
the opera in Munich had a striking effect. Secondly, Edison,
the pioneer in this area, was not only a great inventor, he
was also a good systems engineer and entrepreneur. He built up
a whole system of satisfying the lighting demand beginning from
energy production and distribution up to usage. He determined
the price for one lamp at the level of $0.40 but the cost was
higher, $1.25. After three years he was able to reduce the cost
to $0.37 and to have a great profit from the explosion of the
demand (Oliver 1959).
From these two examples we can understand better the dif-
ference between technological change in a narrow sense and the
innovation process.
EVOLUTION OF LARGE SYSTEMS - THE STARTING
POINT OF INNOVATION CLASSIFICATION
Innovation is always a change in the technological system
with great impact on the given socio-economic system or subsystem.
Such subsystems are:
the complexes and subcomplexes of needs or demands (i.e.,
lighting demand);
the resource complexes or subcomplexes (i.e., energy
sources);
the resource processing cycles from primary to final
stages (i.e., wood cycle).
There are many possible ways of classifying innovations:
1. According to the elements of the production process, we
differentiate between product innovations, process inno-
vations, and manufacturing innovations. Having three
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types of technological change (new, improved, old tech-
nology) we find a 33 = 27 combination, as for example:
a new product produced by an old process in an improved
manufacturing system.
2. Accordingly the economic results of innovations: capital
saving innovations and labor saving innovations, (or in
more detail, material saving innovations, energy saving
innovations, machine saving innovations, and labor saving
innovations) .
Other classifications can be created using the following other
criteria:
classes of needs, being satisfied with the help of
innovation,
types of resources being saved by innovation,
kinds of resource processing systems or industries
touched by innovation,
necessary changes in the direction of investment (new
buildings, rationalization, 'modernization) being inter-
linked with innovation,
source of information calling for innovation,
kind of knowledge used through innovation,
cost of innovation,
factors determining the rise of innovation,
consequences of innovation,
share of research and development needed for innovation,
impact on goals of the given system by innovation,
component of production process (material, machines,
manpower, product, process, organization) affected by
innovation,
level of administration needed for the realization of
innovation,
scale of the firms implementing innovation,
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type of property used fpr innovation,
degree of international competitiveness reached by
innovation, etc.
Groups of interlinked innovations can be found with the help
of cluster analysis, for example the IFO study differentiated
between 20 criteria and 274 features of innovation (see Uhlmann
1978). 218 innovations were classified by cluster analysis into
18 and then later into 11 significant groups (clusters):
market oriented basic innovation in large scale organ-
izations (enterprises),
cost reducing innovations within state owned energy
enterprises,
innovations within non-cooperative leading technological
industrial organizations,
market oriented innovations within leading cooperative
private enterprises,
cost reducing innovations within large scale energy
enterprises without external technology transfer,
innovations based on early technology transfer within
small scale enterprises,
innovations based on technology transfer from energy
distributing enterprises,
innovations realized from independent innovators,
innovations based on trial and error,
market oriented basic innovation according to government
policy,
rationalization innovations sponsored by multinational
corporations.
In our opinion it is not possible to find a univeral classi-
fication of innovation by using theories or empirically based
methods. When we have to establish an innovation classification,
we must first ask, for what purpose we are doing this. As mentioned
we look at the innovation process from the standpoint of national
development or corresponding subsystems and the possibilities of
controlling them. These large systems have three goals:
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1. To ensure their continuing existence and function by
counteracting inhibiting factors.
2. To balance the inner and outer relations of the system
reducing bottlenecks.
3. To find new ways of ensuring efficiency in a changing
environment over a longer term.
From this point of view (the impact of a given technological change
on a large system) we can differentiate between three functions
controlling the large system:
continuation (Fortfuhrung)
compensation (Ausgleich)
push (Antrieb).
For example in the energy system we have the function of continuing
the use of existing primary resources.. Then we have some bottle-
necks in a given energy system with increasing negative conse-
quences on the efficiency. It is necessary to close these bottle-
necks and to ensure the balance of the whole system through mobil-
1s1ng new resources of energy. We also have certain techno-
logical changes, overcoming not only existing ｢ ｯ ｴ ｴ ｬ ･ ｮ ｾ ｣ ｫ ｳ Ｌ but
also establishing new ones. By this they give a great push to the
whole system over a longer time and in reality they change the
existing system into a new one.
In Table 5 we try to show the realization of the functions
mentioned above through two different kinds of innovation. Type
I is mainly connected with a push in the technological level,
and later on the efficiency of a given option. This is often a
result of overcompensation of existing bottlenecks. Type II is
mainly connected with continuation of well-known processes and
compensation of bottlenecks up to the standard level. In this
manner we differentiate between two polar kinds of innovations,
to follow the widespread terminology:
I. Basic Innovation (BI) - Fundamental I - Major I - Strat-
egical I - Radical I - Discontinuous I - Big changes.
II. Improvement Innovation (II) - Incremental I - Minor I _
Tactical I - Rationalization I - Continuous I - Small
changes.
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Table 5. Types of innovation and their functions.
Function Push Compensation
type
BI X X X X
II X X
Continuation
X X X
EFFICIENCY IMPACT OF BASIC AND IMPROVEMENT INNOVATIONS -
THE PRINICIPLE PATTERNS
The main function of BI is to give a push to the existing
system of technology and to change it into a new system with
eminently higher efficiency. The main function II is balancing
the given system by improving its efficiency. However, we have
to take into account that basic innovations are always a certain
complex of smaller changes. In this sense the difference between
type BI and II is relative. But basic innovations consist of
smaller changes, leading over time to increasing returns. Im-
provement innovations starting from the given, more or less old
technology, lead over the same time-span (10 years and more) to
diminishing returns.
The relationship between push and compensation policy, with
the help af two innovation types, can be demonstrated by the
example of ,investment allocation. All investments of a given
industry can be subdivided into
where
1* = 1 1 + 1 2 + C (1)
1 1 = Investment for overcoming bottlenecks in technical
equipment, per employee (compensation investments),
1 2 = Investment for introducing principally new technolo-
gical solutions (push investments), per employee,
C = Replacement and continuation investments.
-14-
Optimization is necessary only for
(2)
The subsequent shares of compensation and push investments are:
i 1
1 1
= T
i 2
1 2
= T
(3 )
and i 1 + i 2 = 1.
If the main criterion is aving of labor force we take the replace-
ment coefficient:
where
1. =
a,
LOP' - L
____ ］ Ｍ ｾ Ｍ Ｑ 100 (percent)
I (4)
LO,1 = number of employees at the time 0 or 1 ,
P' = index of output (P 1/PO)
I = investments
LO - L1 = absolute saving of labor force
'" relative saving ofL = L P' - L1 = labor force.0
So the coefficient 1. shows how many employees are (relatively)
.i,
replaced by a given sum of investments. This coefficient is dif-
ferent for compensation and for push investments, but in both
cases we find an invariance: spending more investments replace-
ment coefficient 1. increases up to a certain point and then
.i,
decreases.
If we assume a very simple dependancy including this invariance
we write
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A 2
li1 = a 12i 1 - a 13i 1
(5 )
A 2
li2 = a 22i2 - a 23i 2
A
The first coefficient li1 shows the relative replacement over the
share of compensation investments i 1 and the second coefficient
li2 shows the relative replacement over the share of push invest-
ments. In general parameters a .. are quite different in both
1J
cases. Compensation investments have rather high replacement
effects at the beginning, but then fast diminishing effects.
Push investments have rather low replacement effects at the
beginning increasing later on and then diminishing.
The whole relative economy of labor is the sum of both
types of replacement:
A A
L = Li 1 + Li 2
"
A A A
L = I 1·l i 1 + I 2l i 2
A
. 2) . 2)L = 1 1 (a 12i 1 - a 131 1 + I 2(a 22i 2 - a 2 31 2
(6 )
(7 )
(8 )
and by i 1 = 1 - i 2 we find
(9)
( 10 )
From
A
dL I(d2 + 2d3i 2 + 3d4i 2
2) 0d i 2
= =
i 2
2
+
2d 3 i+
d 2 03d 4 3d4
=2
( 11)
( 12 )
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we get the optimal solution
( 1 3 )
We must state that the assumption of two quadratic equations
is quite abitrary. It may be more appropriate to use an exponen-
tial function for this purpose. A more complicated problem is
the real statistical identification of the two types of replace-
ment. We used the data from the GDR automobile industry from
1955 to 1970. In the case of car motor production we had the
typical behavior of compensation investments with a lower increase
of equipment per employee and in the case of car assembly we
had the typical behavior of push investments with a higher increase
in equipment per employee. So we compared the investments of the
two types on the example of the two interlinked sub-branches of
automobile.industry.
We determined the parameters in the following equations by
analyzing the time series of investments and replacements of
labor
The whole absolute economy of labor was 1955-1970:
And the relative economy of labor
Then we come to the equation
i 2 ( 1 , 2 ) =
70.7 +
61.8
Ｏ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｒ +
,"61.8
106.9
61.8
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finding an optimal i 2 of nearly 60 percent. The the optimal
replacement is
1 = 6.86 (reI. coefficient)
L = 126,000 employees
The real economy of labor was 1 = 5.26 and L 0 96,000 employees.
So the difference to the optimal solution was 30,000 employees.
The share of push investments in reality was on 33 percent.
Of course investment allocation in the automobile industry is
not only a question of determining the share of push investments
by one criterion. Our example merely gives an illustration of
the opportunities of modeling better the investment allocation
in accordance with innovation policy.
In general we assume the following efficiency of push and
compensation policy (see Figure 2). In Figure 2 the progress
of benefits under push is shown in field 1.1 and the progress of
benefits under compensation is shown in field 2.2. If we overlap
both functions, the efficiency situation of the two types of
innovation becomes quite clear. How near this hypothesis is to
real economic life can be shown in many examples. The figures
in Table 4 for the energy field although given only for one time
point, reflect the same principle pattern.
For short term planning we will always prefer compensation
policy and only for a longer perspective will we choose a certain
relationship between push and compensation policy. In practice
we find many basic innovations have a dominating impact on effi-
ciency of the whole system only 10 years or more after the first
commercial use (Gold 1975). So the main problem is the length
of the optimization period. The shorter this period the more
important a pure improvement policy becomes. It may be interest-
ing that the first long-term plan of a national economy oriented
towards a basic innovation (electricity) - the so-called GOELRO-
plan in the USSR - had a time horizon of 10 to 15 years (1920-
1935) .
-18-
Pus!) Compensation Continuation
benefits ｾ ｾｾ ｾ
->, ｾ ｾ
f- .... f-/ \
BI l- I I- ./ - f-
"I / "-
f- I ｾ
"-
I-
/'
1 I ｾ I I , IV I , ! I I I I •
I I I I , I ...
years .... ｾ
1.1 1.2 1.3
ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ ｾ
-
f- I-
-
f-
"
- f-,......II / <, .....
./ \. f- ..... ......
...... ｾ
I I I I I 1 1 ｾ I I 1 I.... I I I I I ｉＢｾ ....... ....
2. 1 2.2 2.3
Figure 2. Typical benefits of BI and II.
The distinction between BI and II was first made by historians
(Zvorykin et al 1962). Not being operational for economic decision
analysis in technological policy it was a more qualitative theor-
etical approach.
Using the well-known terms BI and II (or revolutionary changes
and evolutionary technological changes (Nick 1974)). We must
stress that we give it another interpretation. In many studies
this distinction means only a certain degree of technological
change. Our starting point is the impact or influence of a given
technological change on the socio-economic system. If we look
at the average efficiency 6f a given system, we find a tendency
to stagnate or decrease, which can be reduced by not stopped by
II. Only BI are able to overcome this tendency, if their effi-
ciency is much higher than the average and their share in output
is sufficient.
The effects of 81 take longer than the effects of II, but
they are higher. Of course, this does not mean that we can for-
get about the effects of II. Over a longer period the effects
of II are comparable with the effects of BI in a certain area.
We have to bear in mind that BI and II are two sides of one coin.
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Underestimation of II is as dangerous as the fear of BI. A major
example is the development in metallurgy. Nevertheless II are
not able to ensure the endless efficiency of a larger system.
Limitless asymptotic increase of efficiency through better balanc-
ing of elements is thinkable only for a closed system, but when
we consider the relations of the large system with the environ-
ment we have to take into account the possibility of sudden or
not so sudden but tremendous changes. These changes may lead to
principle bottleneck resource deficits and conflict situations
which can only be mastered by complex radical solutions.
Basic innovations may have a compensatory function without
a push in the efficiency of the first step of their applications.
This can be the result from the delay in relaizing the basic
innovation. The IIASA Energy study conducted by Wolf Hafele
shows us that in the process of using final energy we can expect
many improvement innovations which helps us to reduce the primary
energy/GOP coefficient from the present value of 0.8 to 0.5 in
the developed countries, while in the developing countries it
can be brought down from 1.5 to 1.0 (Maier 1979). Conversely
the study shows us that we have to be aware of a completely
different development in the field of basic innovations such as
nuclear energy, synthetic fuels, solar energy, biogas, etc.
We expect for the next two decades a rising primary energy/GOP
coefficient resulting from a very extensive demand pull and the
delay in mastering the economy of the basic innovations (see
Mensch 1976).
PSEUDO INNOVATIONS AND OTHER SURPRISES
IN THE WORLD OF INNOVATIONS
We mentioned above only the positive functions of innovations
towards the goals of large systems. However, in reality we have
some innovations, seemingly appropriate to meet the goals of the
socio-economic system or subsystem, but having a negative influence
on it over a long time. Its primary or secondary consequences
damage the efficiency of the system. We call these innovations
pseudo innovations - PI. A larg share of PI we find in the
consumer goods industry. In American supermarkets, where it is
estimated that about 1500 new products appear each year, less
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20 percent survive more than one year on the shelves, the remainder
having proved unsaleable, faddish, risky, or unprofitable, or
made obsolete by comf>etitors with new models. F
Furthermore we can state that positive technological changes
with positive socio-economic potential can appear as negative
innovations. It is necessary to repeat our differentiation
between technological. changes in the narrow sense of the word
and innovations. This can be demonstrated by the scheme shown
in Table 6.
So we can have the situation that a major technological
change (potential BI) occurs only as an II or as a PI. This
depends on the ability to use the innovation potential by chang-
ing many conditi6ns and relations necessary ｾ ｯ ｲ the efficiency
of the new or renewed system. All these conditions change over
time, so a potential BI mayor may not become a real BI. For
example automation of the production process in a given non-
automated industry is a basic innovation. In reality it may
become an improvement innovation if it is not possible to change
the traditional process. Such automation without process changes
is not very efficient. Solar energy is a potential basic inno-
vation, but in reality it may occur only as a pseudo innovation
in the cases where solar heating systems are installed in existing
buildings without changing other preconditions. Another problem
is that an innovation could be determined ｾ ｮ ､ planned as an
Table 6. Change of potential into real innovations of the three
types.
Potential BI
Potential II
Potential PI
Real BI
Automation in
connection with
new processes
Real II
Automation
without chang-
ing the process
Oxygen process
in metallurgy
Real PI
Retrofit solar
heating system
for residential
buildings
Higher speed and
motive power of
automobiles
Product changes
without real
effect for the
consumer.
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improvement innovation and later on we discover that it is really
a basic innovation. The qualitative potential of an innovation
is often not clearly realized and the same is true for its
quantitative potential.
Many innovations are closely interlinked over time. It is
very important to establish positive feedbacks in the innovation
process, for example the railway innovation led to higher coal
demand, higher coal demand required better transport, which was
possible through railways. Interference exists between BI and
II also in the following context. The prehistory and the sub-
sequent history of basic innovations is made up of groups of
small innovations, for example, the incandescent lamp was a basic
innovation, for which many small changes were needed, and from
the time'of Edison until the present day the development of the
incandescent lamp has been a complex of improvement innovations.
Therefore we can differentiate between II leading to BI, and II
using the efficiency potential of BI. This shows us the close
interaction between II and BI. BI is a result of a long selec-
tion process in a wide field of smaller innovations, which are
in competition with each other. So BI is like i package of
technological changes, which create a new quality for the system
touched upon. When a new basic innovation develops it establishes
a great efficiency potential. This can only be more or less
fully mobilized by quite a lot of improvement innovations. We
call this kind of improvement innovation, incremental innovation.
We also have some smaller changes in the technology manufacturing
process and organization where it is not possible to identify
their connections with a determined basic innovation.
TYPOLOGY OF BASIC, IMPROVEMENT AND PSEUDO INNOVATIONS -
A MORE DETAILED APPROACH
Concerning basic innovations we have to take into account
that their technological level, their range of application and
their impact on national economy are also quite different. Tech-
nological level is closely connected with the necessary type and
amount of mission-oriented fundamental research, applied research
and development. So it is understandable why the IFO-Institute
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study proposed to call all technological changes which go through
research and development stages, basic innovations, (Uhlmann 1978).
Another extreme is to call only the main historical breakthroughs
in technology basic innovations, such as the steam engine,
tool machine, electricity and several others. We cannot
call BI pure scientific or technical results (inventions). These
are only the first steps which may become a BI, but this depends
on the concrete resource situation, the socio-economic needs and
the capability of a given society to master it. Therefore, it
is not possible to speak about BI without social considerations.
In our time we would propose calling basic innovations, such
major technological changes which
are based on fundamental and applied research,
have a well-defined high range of application (essential
modification of existing demand or application complex
(e.g. synthetic fibres) arising of a new demand or appli-
cation complex (e.g. TV) or changing the whole system of
needs (e.g. production and consumption of electricity)
are connected with new scientific-technological principles
of a different order.
Therefore we can differentiate between three kinds of basic inno-
vations (see Table 7). BI gives a great push to the whole socio-
economic system, having an enormous efficiency potential they are
able to halt and to change the tendency of decreasing efficiency
in using resources.
The technological level of innovations is also an important
indicator, but its connection with efficiency of the system
touched upon is not linear. We know of some historical basic
innovations not based on new scientific-technological principles
(for example, the Hargreave machine). On the other hand we have
some innovations of a highly scientific-technological level,
which did not find a wide range or field of application (for
example, coal arc lamp in the 19th century).
Returning to improvement innovations we can here differen-
tiate between four types (see Table 8): very important II,
important II, normal II, and marginal II.
Table 7. Types of basic innovations BI.
Middle Basic I. Middle
BI2
No.
1 •
2 •
3.
Type B
Major Basic I.
BI1
Mi.nor Bas ic I.
BI3
Fundamental
Research
Share
High
Low
Applied
Research
Share
High
High
Middle
Range of
Application
Change of the
whole system of
needs and its
structure
Establishing of
a new demand
complex (or
market)
Essential modi-
fication of
existing demand
complexes
Push on
Production
System
Change of the
whole produc-
tion system
New package of
industrial
branches
New industrial
branches
Examples
Use of Micro-
electronics new
energy sy.stems
Use of Micro-
processors
Nuclear energy
Use of fast
breeders
I
i-;..l
W
I
Table 8. Types of improvement innovations II.
No. Type Fundamental Develop- I Range of application Impact on Examples
and Applied ment production
Research share systems
Share
1. Very Middle High New demand. New New indus- Use of polyester"
important product" in an exist- trial sub-
111 ing demand complex branches
2. Important Low Middle Essential modification New product Use of Thomas-
112 of the demand ｣ ｯ ｭ ｰ ｬ ･ ｸ ｾ lines or Steel process
New parameters of processes Electric tooth-
well-known products brushes
3. Normal No Low Simple modification Improved Flouride IN
113 of existing demand. product toothpaste ｾ
Improved parameters lines or I
of well-known pro- processes
ducts
4. Small No No Low improvements Low im-:- Better touch-
changes provements on telephones
114
(Marginal
II)
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We can also distinguish between three kinds of Pseudo-
Innovation (PI):
PI(1) Simple product innovations without improving effi-
ciency of the user system. (For example, many auto-
mobile changeovers.)
PI(2) Innovations which improve efficiency in one process,
but reduce the efficiency of the whole system (for
example, plastic materials which are not appropriate
to the needs).
PI(3) Innovations which improve the efficiency of the
system only in the short term, but then lead to big
losses and imbalances (for example, some process
innovations in the chemical industry which later
have a negative influence on the whole environment).
Therefore we have the following ten main types of innovations:
BI
Ｎ Ｏ ｉ ｾ
BI1 BI2 BI3
I
J
ＯＯｾ
111 112 113 114
"-PI
Ｏ ｉ ｾ
PI1' PI2 PI3
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 110
We think that these types can be identified. Of course, if we
look at the ocean of innovations they all build up a certain
continuum not measurable by one clear indicator. Some people
consider this only as a continuum, but we have to take into
account the obvious existing turning points or break-even points
in complexity, in efficiency, and in manageability, in this
total field of innovation. For instance, in the socialist coun-
tries all scientific-technological tasks of one planning cycle
are associated with a certain level of administration from the
firm to the centre. These different types of technological task
have various prerequisites in management and planning.
We do not want a complete or eclectic classification of all
innovation types, and therefore the above mentioned relations
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are the most important from our standpoint. We concentrate on
the transition process from a given structure of technologies to
a new structure of technologies, able to overcome major gaps in
resource processing systems and socio-economic bottlenecks. We
made the following more sophisticated classification by the tech-
nological level and the range of application (Table 9). So now
we can differentiate between 7 x 7 = 49 kinds of innovation.
INNOVATION LEVEL INDEX -
A FIRST ROUGH ESTIMATION
Establishing an innovation classifcation the next step could
be a kind of quantitative evaluation by a technology level index.
This was made in an OECD investigation of 1242 innovations in
five countries from 1953 up to 1973. (Table 10). In column (1)
a linear level index is given, used by the OECD study. However,
we think that an exponential level index would be more appropriate.
The distance between basic and improvement innovations should be
higher than the distance between different kinds of improvement
innovations. The frequency distribution in column (4) also points
to an exponential pattern. Another argument can be the exponen-
tial growth of technological parameters in the transition period
to new principle solutions and the exponential saturation in the
improvement period. If we assume that the importance of innova-
tions w (a coefficient between 1 and 100) follows an exponential
function and the two parameters i k and vk are connected in a
multiplicative form, we can write:
( 14 )
( 15)
w = e(a+b)k
Taking a simple symmetric scheme (a = b) we then have
1ak
w = e k = 0,1, ... ,6
Table 9. Classification of innovations by technological level and range of application.
Range of II BI
Application Simple modi-
fication of Essential Arising of a Essential
modification
Quantitative existing of existing new demand modification Arising of a Change of
NO Vk growth of
demand demand (New (new product of existing new demand the whole(Improved or process) demand com-
Scientific- existing parameters parameters in the plex by new complex or system of
Technological demand of existing of existing existing de- products or subcomplex needs
Level products or products and mand complex processes
processes) processes)
.
ik 1,0 1,5 2,2 ... 3 2 4,6 6,8 10,0
Quantitative
growth of
1 thu existing 1,0 1 1,5 2,2 3,2 4,6 6,8 10,0
technical
basis
Improvement Bentwood Bicycle
2 within well- 1,5 1,5 2,3 Furniture 4,8 6,9 10,0 15,0known tech- 3.5
nieal prin.
As 2 but Oxygen Thomas Diesel Paper
with essen- process process engine production
3 tial changes 2,2 2,2 3,3 4,8 7 10 15 22
of 1 factor
(mats., tool
func. desigJi
As 3 but with Stitching Atomic ice- Electrical Spinning
4 ess. changes 3,2 3,2 4,8 bond breakes railway Jenny
of sev. fac. 7 10 15 22 33
New solutions Gyrocompass Polyethylene Detergents Vacuum lamp
5 within well- 4,6 4,6 6,9 10 15 22 33 46known basic
pr inciple
New basic Synt:hetic Incandescent
prin. within fibres lamp
6 same form or 6,8 6,8 10 15 22 33 46 68
s truc. level
of substance
New basic Radar Transistor Electricity
pr In , chang-
7 illg form or 10,0 10 15 22 33 46 68 100
I struc. level
I of suuat.an ceI
------- - --
I
tv
-.J
I
Table 10. Frequency and level of innovation activities in five DECO countries
1953-1973.
No. Types Level Level Frequency Frequency
Linear Exponential abs. per cent
o to 100 1 to 100
(0) (1) (2) 13 ) Ji)1. Marginal 0-44 1-2 60
I
2. Normal II 45-55 3-5 239 19 N00
I
3. Important II 56-66 0-10 149 12
4 . Very Important II 67-78 11-21 62 5
5. Radical II 78-89 22-46 29 2
6. BI 90-100 47-100 7 1
0-100 1-100 1242 100
Source: Mensch, G (1976) Gemischtwirtschaftliche Innovations praxis.
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According to 1 < w < 100 (percent) we find for k = 6
100 12a= e
ln100
a = 12 = 0,38376
From that we find the coefficients of importance of each level
within the 7 x 7 = 49 field (see Table 9).
When we try to adjoin one innovation in the 7 x 7 = 49 field
(Table 9) we realize that we often have some difficulties in
making an exact estimation and so we feel that it is not appro-
priate to sophisticate the main innovation classification too far.
This does not mean that for special studies and innovations we
do not need a more detailed typology.
TYPES OF INNOVATION AND THE EFFICIENCY CYCLE
The investigation of the different role of basic and improve-
ment innovations can help us to better understand why the innova-
tion process is not as one would assume, a continuous process,
but rather an interrupted sequence of innovation pushes and
innovation lacks. It is the relationship between basic and im-
provement innovations which drives the process of technological
and economic development. This relationship is the core of the
special circumstances surrounding the birth, growth and decline
of each successive new branch of industry. This shows why the
simple market-demand models or science-push models are inadequate
explanations of the process of innovations in specific branches
of manufacturing in the economy as a whole. The interaction
between science, technology, and economy varies in its natur2
and intensity over time and among various industries.
We cannot say that inventions are always the simple result
of demand pull. Needs and demand are the main driving factor
in the diffusion process. So when we look at the innovation
process in a retrospective manner we find that they are all
caused by an existing need. But in reality the more important
inventions were made in a rather probabilistic cognition process
arriving at goals not having been realized before. So it was in
-30-
the case of penicillin, saccharin and synthetic rubber. At the
end of the invention process needs were satisfied which were not
the original aims of their research and development processes.
Often demand pull is the main reason for incremental innovations
using the efficiency potential of basic innovation. But funda-
mental inventions are less or not so directly connected with the
market demand or concrete needs. Basic innovations create new
fields' for production and efficiency. The basis for this could
be a series of new scientific discoveries and technological
advances. The connection between these advances and the develop-
ing needs of the society is often realized very slowly.
The role of basic and improvement innovations in the devel-
opment of efficiency can be demonstrated with the following
simple model (Figure 3) ..
What is the impact of basic and improvement innovations
like in relation to the economy. Efficiency is in general
(16 )
where
EO =
Co =
e
the sum of benefits or revenues at the time t = 0
the sum of costs or expenditures at the time t = o.
p = 1 p < 1
p = 1
e without B1
--------
--
--
--
---
p < 1
Main role of B1
time
Figure 3. Development of efficiency.
At the time t 1 we find,
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1 +
1 +
( 17 )
!'IE = E1 - EO
!'IC = C1 - Co
The increase of E can be divided into
!'IE = !'lEN + !'lEA
( 1 8 )
( 1 9 )
!'lEN = increase in benefits or revenues from new processes
and products,
!'lEA = increase in benefits or revenues from old processes
and products.
And in the same time for costs,
( 21 )
Therefore we corne to
e = e . p1 0
( 22)
( 23)
A pure improvement policy gives us
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and
6C = 0N
However, at the first time high benefits 6EA in connection with
moderate expenditures 6CA. Therefore we have p > 1. But later
on we have diminishing returns and therefore we get p < 1 and a
certain decrease in efficiency.
A pure or dominant improvement policy leads to a situation
described by many authors as "productivity dilemma" (technolo-
gisches Patt). In this situation the main attention is given
to short-term gains, and new basic innovations do not occur or
they are delayed. The inertia of the given technological system
becomes a major barrier for further economic progress. Therefore
efficiency e is declining because it is not being stopped by gains
from substantial improvement innovations. The reason for this
is the inevitable increase in costs for resources, environment,
and infrastructure.
This situation is critical for the further development of
the economy. If we are not able to implement a new push of basic
inventions which can open new directions and fields of economic
activity and thus improving efficiency, the result must necessarily
be the decline of the capability of society to meet national and
personal needs, to overcome shortages in the resource situation,
to avoid unemployment, and also to promote the conditions for
business activity especially in the field of investment. In
the case p < 1 the innovation process has run dry because of
pseudo innovations (i.e. innovations without positive influence
on the efficiency) or through improvement innovations which are
not able to compensate the increasing costs. The result of this
tendency is stagnation and crises with great social and political
consequences. The nature of these resource crises is different
from the usual ups and downs in the business cycle of capital
reproduction (7 - 10 years).
The very different forms of discontinuous development of
the economy also need different social and managerial responses.
The response of the resource crisis could only be a push of social
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and technological innovations. This is why many investigations
were devoted to identifying a significant relationship between
resource crises and basic innovation frequency. The realization
of basic innovation was always a complicated social process which
coincided with the arising social problems. We have enough
examples in history in which the inability to realize basic tech-
nological innovations has resulted in social and political crises
(Kuczynski 1975, Mensch 1975, Freeman 1978, Forrester 1978,
Freeman 1979). Such historical analysis may help us to better
understand the responsibility we have in mastering the process
of innovation to meet social needs more appropriately and prevent
social catastrophes.
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